30/08/2014

Britain and the EU: A long and rocky relationship



Now it is centre stage again, and the debates between Eurosceptic Nigel Farage and Europhile Nick Clegg bring the argument down to a stark, binary choice not seriously faced in decades - In, or Out.
But why does Europe produce such a polarised reaction? Many Britons, on both sides of the debate, love visiting European countries and idolise elements of their culture - not least the food. Indeed, more than 1.5 million Britons have moved there to live.
But Europeans viewing British newspaper coverage, political debates or opinion polls would be forgiven for thinking we have little but contempt for our neighbours. It is, to say the least, a complex relationship.
The weight of history
Maybe it is the long history of hostilities that clouds the British view of Europe with suspicion. As an empire builder and major trading power it was inevitable that Britain would come into conflict with rivals vying for the same territories and trade routes. And allegiances shifted. All of its main rivals - Germany in the world wars, Russia in the Cold War, and France through most of modern history - have also at times been important allies.
But for many historians the most enduring influence on Britain's self-image is World War Two. And it may be that the popular perception of Britain in its Darkest Hour, standing alone as the British Empire against Nazi Germany in 1940-41, informs a modern view of the UK as its own best friend. And that if anyone can be relied on to come to her aid, it is the United States.

An insular mentality?




Britain, obviously, is an island nation. Is this the key to its arms-length attitude to Europe? For centuries "we lived in splendid isolation, protected by the Navy and the Empire", the historian Vernon Bogdanor has said. "Now, of course, that period of isolation has long gone, but perhaps it still retains some of its impact upon the British people, who do not want ties with the Continent."
But other members of the EU - Ireland, Malta, and Cyprus - are islands, and they do not object so much to handing powers to Brussels. Perhaps it is Britain's island mentality, combined with that imperial hangover, that is at play - Britain is used to giving orders, not taking them.

An end to war



The formation of the European Union had its origins after 1945, in the desire to tie Europe's nations so closely together that they could never again wreak such damage on each other. Winston Churchill fully supported this idea, proposing for Europe "a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom... a kind of United States of Europe".
But as the European Coal and Steel Community was forged in 1951, Britain stood on the sidelines; and it declined an invitation to join the six founding nations of the European Economic Community in signing the Treaty of Rome in 1957.
One of the architects of the ECSC, Frenchman Jean Monnet, said: "I never understood why the British did not join. I came to the conclusion that it must have been because it was the price of victory - the illusion that you could maintain what you had, without change."

Britain wants in



With its own economy stuck in a rut, Britain saw France and Germany posting a strong post-war recovery and forming a powerful alliance, and changed its mind. It applied to join the EEC in 1961, only for entry to be vetoed - twice - by French President Charles de Gaulle. He accused Britain of a "deep-seated hostility" towards European construction, and of being more interested in links with the US.
Britain may have had selfish reasons for wanting to sign up, but then seeking mutual benefits is part of the motivation for the European project. As the historian James Ellison points out, Europe has not just been a place of conflict for Britain over the centuries. "It was also a place of diplomatic agreement, trade, co-operation and - through most of the second half of the 20th Century and the 21st - peace and stability and growth," he says.
Britain gets in


Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath finally led Britain into the EEC in 1973, after Gen de Gaulle had left office. When membership was put to a referendum in 1975, it had the support of Britain's three main parties and all its national newspapers. The result was resounding - with more than 67% voting in favour. But that did not end the debate. There was no immediate economic fillip - in fact strikes and power cuts continued, and rising oil prices caused double-digit inflation.
Role reversal

Margaret Thatcher campaigned for EEC membership in 1975


In the 1970s, the Conservatives backed British membership - though there was some opposition on the right of the party. The most concerted opposition came from the left of the Labour party, led by Tony Benn and Michael Foot. Mr Foot's 1983 Labour manifesto promised withdrawal from the EEC - by then more commonly called the European Community (EC) - after the pro-Europe wing of the party had split off to form the SDP.
"Europe has been a toxic issue in British politics," Prof Bogdanor says, not just because it caused division between parties, "but also deep divisions within the parties".
"Some might argue that the fundamental conflict in post-war British politics is not so much between left and right as between those who believe that Britain's future lies with Europe and those who believe it does not."
Rising antipathy



In 1984, Margaret Thatcher corrected what was seen as an injustice, negotiating a permanent rebate for Britain on its EC contributions, because it received much less in agricultural subsidies than some other countries, notably France.
The 1980s saw a growing divide between Britain and Brussels, where the socialist Jacques Delors had taken the helm at the European Commission and was steering towards a more federal Europe and a single currency.
Mrs Thatcher was uncompromising. Her 1988 speech in Bruges, in which she rejected "a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels", has become a seminal text for Eurosceptics. But, with many Europhiles in her cabinet (far more than nowadays), her stance fuelled the Conservatives' internal warfare, and helped lead eventually to her downfall.
Humiliation

"Black Wednesday" was one of the lowest points in Britain's relationship with Europe. After failing to fend off intense currency speculation, Chancellor of the Exchequer Norman Lamont was forced to announce Britain's withdrawal from the Exchange Rate Mechanism on 16 September, 1992.
1992 and all that




Mrs Thatcher had been unable to stop Europe's march towards political union, and was gone by the time the Maastricht Treaty was signed by her successor John Major in 1992. This involved huge transfers of power to the new European Union. Britain secured opt-outs from the single currency and the social chapter. But to the treaty's critics - including many Tory rebels - it undermined the British tradition of the inviolable sovereignty of parliament.
Building bridges...
A pro-European Tony Blair was well received in Europe - until the Iraq war


Tony Blair followed a landslide election victory in 1997 by quickly patching things up with Europe. He signed Britain up to the social chapter, delivering some of the social protections long coveted on the left, and setting his sights on the euro. But Britain's economy was doing well, support for euro entry was not widespread, and Chancellor Gordon Brown put the plans on hold.
…and burning them?

David Cameron became the first British PM to block a new European treaty


The euro crisis has put paid to any prospect of Britain adopting the single currency, and has perhaps fuelled the Euroscepticism that now apparently runs strongly through parts of the Conservative Party and the public at large.
In December 2011, as EU leaders tried to tackle their problems through a treaty setting new budget rules, David Cameron demanded exemptions and then vetoed the pact. To critics, this cut Britain adrift. But it delighted Eurosceptics and encouraged them to demand more. Soon enough, the prime minister promised a referendum on British membership. Britain's most poisonous political issue was back centre stage.

29/08/2014

The Troubles 1968 - 1998

The conflict in Northern Ireland during the late 20th century is known as the Troubles. Over 3,600 people were killed and thousands more injured.

Over the course of three decades, violence on the streets of Northern Ireland was commonplace and spilled over into mainland Britain, the Republic of Ireland and as far afield as Gibraltar.

Several attempts to find a political solution failed until the Good Friday Agreement, which restored self-government to Northern Ireland and brought an end to the Troubles.

The Troubles refers to a violent thirty-year conflict that began with a civil rights march in Londonderry on 5 October 1968 and concluded with the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998

At the heart of the conflict lay the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.
The goal of the unionist and overwhelmingly Protestant majority was to remain part of the United Kingdom. The goal of the nationalist and republican, almost exclusively Catholic, minority was to become part of the Republic of Ireland.

This was a territorial conflict, not a religious one. At its heart lay two mutually exclusive visions of national identity and national belonging. The principal difference between 1968 and 1998 is that the people and organisations pursuing these rival futures eventually resolved to do so through peaceful and democratic means. This ascendancy of politics over violence was not easily achieved.

During the Troubles, the scale of the killings perpetrated by all sides - republican and loyalist paramilitaries and the security forces - eventually exceeded 3,600. As many as 50,000 people were physically maimed or injured, with countless others psychologically damaged by the conflict, a legacy that continues to shape the post-1998 period.

Direct rule returns

In 1968, the Northern Ireland parliament had been dominated by unionists for over fifty years. Its attempts to solve social and political ills, such as institutional discrimination against Catholics, were too slow for nationalists and republicans and too quick for many unionists. This gave rise to growing tension and violence between the two communities.
The mounting scale of the disorder led successive UK governments to intervene. In 1969, the situation was so grave that British troops were sent to help restore order. By 1972, things had deteriorated so badly that the British government suspended the Northern Ireland parliament and imposed direct rule from London.
Relegated to the margins of UK politics for half a century, Northern Ireland had suddenly reclaimed centre stage.

The 'long war'

At this time, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) - the main republican paramilitary organisation in Northern Ireland - was uninterested in any solution short of British withdrawal and Irish unification. The 'Provisionals' had split from the 'Official IRA' in 1969 and are subsequently referred to here as the IRA.
For them, the 'long war' was the only option. This strategy had been gaining traction since the introduction of internment (imprisonment without trial) in 1971 and the killing of 13 people by the Parachute Regiment on Bloody Sunday the following year.
When secret talks with the UK government in 1972 collapsed, the IRA leadership resolved to erode the British presence in Northern Ireland through a war of attrition.
For their part, the major loyalist paramilitary organisations of the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) had resolved to use violence to resist republican paramilitaries and to oppose Irish unification.
It was against this backdrop of soaring violence and increasingly entrenched positions that moves to find a lasting solution began.

Sunningdale's frosty reception

Direct rule by British ministers was viewed as a short-term measure and a process designed to restore self-government to Northern Ireland was soon underway. The first attempt was the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement, which provided for both a devolved, power-sharing administration and a role for the Irish government in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland - the so-called 'Irish dimension'.
Together with the UK and Irish governments, just three Northern Ireland political parties participated in the Sunningdale talks - the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), the nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and the centre-ground Alliance Party. The Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) was wholly opposed to Sunningdale and did not participate. Representatives of the 'extremes' - loyalist and republican paramilitaries - were not invited.
Sunningdale's political institutions collapsed in early 1974, toppled by the Ulster Workers Council (UWC) strike, a near-insurrection spearheaded by a coalition of unionists and loyalists that effectively brought Northern Ireland to a standstill.
Although Sunningdale was ultimately a failure, it contained the seeds of the much more intricate and successful Good Friday Agreement twenty five years later.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement

As the cycle of violence escalated post-Sunningdale, further efforts were made by successive UK governments to devise a political settlement, but only one acceptable to those parties it considered "legitimate" and non-violent.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) in 1985 was a serious attempt to achieve a political accord that resolved the "Irish question". It gave the Irish government an advisory role in the affairs of Northern Ireland and determined there would be no change in Northern Ireland's constitutional status - no Irish unification in other words - without the consent of its people. Nonetheless, the treaty broadly alienated the unionist community, which opposed Irish involvement and rejected the proposal for a devolved, power-sharing government. Among the major parties in Northern Ireland, only the SDLP and Alliance Party supported the AIA.
Sinn Féin, the "political wing" of the IRA, was as vociferously opposed to the agreement as unionists. The party had grown in prominence and influence since republican hunger striker Bobby Sands was elected a member of parliament on a wave of popular support shortly before he died in 1981. It had shown Sinn Féin the power of political engagement and led to the adoption of a strategy known as "the armalite and the ballot box" in which the IRA would continue the "armed struggle" while Sinn Féin contested Northern Ireland elections.
Crucially, when the IRA announced a ceasefire in 1994, mainstream republican leaders had recognized that the 'long war' was unwinnable. (Equally, the British Army had come to the view that the conflict could not be won solely by military means.) Sinn Féin's commitment to politics and the electoral process enabled it to enter negotiations designed to end the Troubles and restore self-government to Northern Ireland.

Peace process

Cross-party talks began in earnest in 1996. In almost all quarters, a combination of political realism and war-weariness cleared the path to negotiation. Importantly, President of the United States Bill Clinton took an active personal role, appointing veteran US senator George Mitchell as chair of the talks process that concluded in the Good Friday Agreement.
Negotiating with Sinn Féin was unpalatable for many unionists and loyalists. The UUP, under leader David Trimble, agreed to participate only if those they regarded as terrorists were committed to exclusively peaceful and democratic means. Representatives of loyalist paramilitaries also agreed to take part. By contrast, Ian Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) viewed the whole process as unacceptable. They abandoned the talks and opposed the subsequent agreement, but still took their seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly that resulted.
Nevertheless, the Good Friday Agreement marked a seismic shift in Northern Ireland's political landscape. The UUP and SDLP agreed to accept power-sharing, including with former paramilitaries who were committed to the peace process.
All signatories to the agreement endorsed the "consent principle". This meant that any change in Northern Ireland's constitutional status - Irish unification - would happen only popular majorities voted in favour in separate referendums held at the same time on both sides of the border.

After the Good Friday Agreement

If the Good Friday Agreement and the return of self-government to Northern Ireland had been an enormous challenge for all concerned, so was its fitful implementation. Many significant issues remained unresolved in 1998, not least the decommissioning of republican and loyalist weapons.
These and other matters were now susceptible to the force of argument rather than the argument of force. Even so, the first phase of devolved power-sharing was to prove fragile and short-lived, requiring the re-introduction of direct rule from 2002 until 2007.
Only then had sufficient trust been developed between the communities to enable the restoration of devolution.
When government returned to Stormont buildings in Belfast, this time it involved a fully inclusive power-sharing arrangement that embraced both the DUP and Sinn Féin - now the dominant parties within their respective electorates.
This partnership of constitutional opposites is perhaps the most remarkable outcome of the Troubles, and one that underlines the triumph of politics over violence in post-conflict Northern Ireland.

Source: BBC.CO.UK
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/
 

 

Profile: The Commonwealth



Commonwealth heads of government meet in Malta, 2005

Formerly known as the British Commonwealth, the Commonwealth of Nations is a loose association of former British colonies and current dependencies, along with some countries that have no historical ties to Britain.

The modern Commonwealth has its roots in the Imperial Conferences of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, when some of the colonies within the British Empire began to acquire greater autonomy.
As some achieved self-government and varying degrees of independence from Britain, a new constitutional definition of their relationship with one another had to be found.



OVERVIEW

It was only after the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947 that the Commonwealth acquired its modern shape. It dropped the word British from its name, the allegiance to the crown from its statute, and became an association for decolonised nations. The British monarch, however, remained the official head of the Commonwealth.
The Commonwealth has no constitution or charter, but the heads of government of its member states hold Commonwealth Heads of Government Meetings (CHOGM) every two years to discuss issues of common interest.
In between the summits, the London-based Secretariat - the Commonwealth's executive arm - takes responsibility for carrying out programmes agreed upon during the various meetings. The Secretariat is headed by a secretary-general.



FACTS

  • Founded: 1931
  • Members: 54 states
  • Headquarters (secretariat): Marlborough House, London
  • Population: 1.8 billion (30% of world population)
  • Key bodies: Commonwealth Foundation, Commonwealth of Learning


LEADERS

Head: Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II
As head of the Commonwealth, the Queen is recognised by its members as the "symbol of their free association". She attends the Commonwealth summits and the Commonwealth Games, which are held every four years. Also, on every Commonwealth Day, which is the second Monday in March, she broadcasts a message to all member countries.

Secretary-general: Kamalesh Sharma
The secretary-general acts as the chief executive of the Commonwealth. He is elected by heads of government from among Commonwealth diplomats and foreign ministers for a maximum of two four-year terms.


Commonwealth Secretary-General Kamalesh Sharma
Mr Sharma has devoted much of his career to development work
The present secretary-general, Kamalesh Sharma, was elected in November 2007 and assumed office on 1 April 2008. An Indian diplomat, he had previously served as India's High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.
Prior to his posting to Britain, Mr Sharma was UN Special Representative to East Timor where he helped to build up the institutions of the newly-independent country.



ISSUES

The Commonwealth has been criticised for being a post-colonial club. But to its members it is a voluntary association of independent states in the business of promoting democracy, good government, human rights and economic development.
It has also been criticised for having little influence. Indeed, the Commonwealth does not act as a bloc in international affairs and has little influence over non-members.
However, its influence over its own members derives from the benefits which membership brings in developmental support and cooperation on international goals.


Closing ceremony of 2002 Commonwealth Games
Commonwealth Games 2002, held in Manchester, UK
Unlike the United Nations, Commonwealth members have no contractual obligations, but members commit themselves to the statements of beliefs set out by heads of government.
In 1995 the Commonwealth set up a Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG), comprising eight ministers, whose function is to deal with governments which persistently violate Commonwealth principles. It can take such punitive collective measures as imposing economic sanctions or suspending recalcitrant members.
However, the Commonwealth draws its main strength from its moral authority. Committed to racial equality and national sovereignty, it was the focus of the campaign against apartheid in the 1980s. In 1995 it suspended Nigeria's membership after the military regime there passed the death sentence on the writer Ken Saro-Wiwa and other activists, and in 2000 it suspended Fiji after the overthrow of the elected government.
Zimbabwe was suspended in March 2002, after elections which observers said were marred by violence and intimidation. In December 2003 the suspension was extended indefinitely. The Zimbabwean government responded by announcing the country was leaving the Commonwealth for good.
Pakistan was suspended twice during the military rule of President Pervez Musharraf.

Membership of the Commonwealth brings some practical benefits through the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC). This is the main way in which the Commonwealth promotes economic and social development and the alleviation of poverty. 





Source: BBC.CO.UK - Page last updated at 15:18 GMT, Wednesday, 1 February 2012
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_profiles/1554175.stm

Devolution: A beginner's guide

Source:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/election_2010/first_time_voter/8589835.stm
Thursday, 29 April 2010


Since 1999, the way the United Kingdom is run has been transformed by devolution - a process designed to decentralise government and give more powers to the three nations which, together with England, make up the UK.

The United Kingdom is made up of England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Devolution essentially means the transfer of powers from the UK parliament in London to assemblies in Cardiff and Belfast, and the Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh. 

When did it begin?

Public votes were held in 1997 in Scotland and Wales, and a year later in both parts of Ireland.
This resulted in the creation of the Scottish Parliament, the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland Assembly.
Devolution applied in different ways in each nation due to historical and administrative differences.

What powers are devolved?
The table below gives an overview of the main powers given to the Northern Irish and Welsh assemblies, and the Scottish Parliament. 



What powers are not devolved?

The UK government is responsible for national policy on all powers which have not been devolved.
These are known usually as "reserved powers" and include foreign affairs, defence, international relations and economic policy.
This table gives an overview of the main non-devolved powers. 




The Westminster Parliament is technically still able to pass laws for any part of the UK, but in practice only deals with devolved matters with the agreement of the devolved governments.

Devolution in Northern Ireland


Stormont
The Northern Ireland Assembly sits at Stormont in Belfast
Devolution here is slightly different to Scotland and Wales, with government powers divided into three categories: transferred, reserved and excepted.
The power-sharing agreement between the Nationalist and Unionist communities in Northern Ireland is critical to the functioning of the assembly; devolution of powers has been suspended and reinstated several times since its inception in 1998.
In addition to the main devolved powers shown in the table, the assembly can also legislate on culture, arts and leisure, learning and employment and regional and social development.
In March 2010, an agreement was passed to transfer powers of justice and policing to Northern Ireland.
Reserved powers - which could be transferred in the future with cross-community consent - include prisons and civil defence.
A third category - excepted powers - includes matters such as parliamentary and assembly elections, international relations and defence.
These cannot be transferred without primary legislation from Westminster.

Devolution in Scotland


Scottish parliament building
The Scottish parliament is based at Holyrood in Edinburgh
Scotland has a "parliament" as opposed to an "assembly" - the crucial difference being that Holyrood is a legislation-making body, passing bills in various areas of its many devolved responsibilities.
The Scottish parliament also has the power to raise or lower the basic rate of income tax by 3p in the pound - although this so-called "Tartan Tax" has never been used.
In addition to the main devolved powers shown in the table, the parliament can legislate on tourism, economic development, planning, natural and built heritage, sport and the arts, as well as statistics, public registers and records.
The primary powers retained by Westminster include foreign policy, defence and trade and industry.

Devolution in Wales


Welsh Assembly building
The Welsh Assembly building is in Cardiff
The Government of Wales Act of 2006 gives the Welsh assembly powers to make its own laws, but limits its scope to defined "fields"; a broad subject area such as education or health.
Within these fields, the assembly is able to enact its own laws, known as measures. The major areas in which the assembly can legislate are listed in the table above.
In addition, the assembly can make laws relating to ancient monuments and historic buildings, public administration, sport and recreation, tourism, town and country planning, flood defences, the assembly itself, and the Welsh language.
By omission, anything not contained in the current list of measures remains under the control of the Parliament in Westminster.
The assembly is split into executive and legislative branches: the Welsh assembly government controls day-to-day running of devolved policy areas within the country, while the National Assembly for Wales scrutinises and debates the assembly government's work.
The assembly could increase its powers in the future and may one day evolve into a body similar to the Scottish Parliament.
In February 2010, assembly members voted in favour of holding a referendum on devolving further powers from Westminster. This motion must now gain approval from both Houses of Parliament.

Why is there not an 'English parliament'?

The UK government is responsible for all matters in England which have been devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
However devolution has caused some tensions, particularly over public spending.
The new powers of the Scottish Parliament have allowed it to abolish university tuition fees and prescription charges. These services are not free in England.
However Scotland's public services are still paid for by all UK taxpayers under the terms of the Barnett formula, which allocates funding around different parts of the country.
Some in England are increasingly unhappy, seeing this as English taxpayers subsidising free services in Scotland.
A recent survey of 980 people by the left-leaning think tank the Institute for Public Policy Research suggested 40% of those questioned believe this situation unfair, compared with 22% in 2003.

Delivering the report, Professor John Curtice said if the trends continued, politicians "may no longer be able to safely assume that England can be ignored in the devolution debate".

Key facts: The Falklands War

Source: BBC.CO.UK
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/guides/457000/457033/html/



Introduction:

On 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands, a remote UK colony in the South Atlantic. The move led to a brief, but bitter war.

Argentina's military junta hoped to restore its support at a time of economic crisis, by reclaiming sovereignty of the islands. It said it had inherited them from Spain in the 1800s and they were close to South America.

The UK, which had ruled the islands for 150 years, quickly chose to fight. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said the 1,800 Falklanders were "of British tradition and stock". A task force was sent to reclaim the islands, 8,000 miles away.

In the fighting that followed, 655 Argentine and 255 British servicemen lost their lives, as did three Falkland Islanders.




Clockwise from top left: Captured Argentine soldiers; injured British serviceman from HMS Sheffield; UK soldier during advance; HMS Sheffield on fire; UK troops raise flag: Argentine soldiers on Falklands


Task Force:

The battle for the Falklands began with the declaration of a 200-mile exclusion zone around the islands.

The UK task force had 28,000 troops and over 100 ships, in total. Argentina had 12,000 mainly conscripted soldiers on the Falklands and about 40 vessels. Its superior air power was limited by the islands' remoteness.

South Georgia was re-taken on 25 April and on 1 May the RAF launched its first aerial assault, on Stanley's airport.

The first major loss of life came on 2 May with the sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, and the loss of 368 crew. Two days later, the British destroyer, HMS Sheffield, was hit by an Exocet missile and sank with the loss of 20 crew.



The Battle:

Seven weeks after the Argentines invaded, the first major British troop landing began at San Carlos on 21 May. The plan was to launch attacks from there on Goose Green and Stanley.

The battle for Goose Green lasted a day and night and was fiercely fought, with many dead. British troops were hugely outnumbered but ultimately successful.

Victory meant British forces were clear to break out of San Carlos and begin the long march east towards Stanley. Carrying 120lb packs on their backs, the troops fought their way across the peat bogs of East Falkland before mounting their final attack on the last line of Argentine defence, the high ground around Stanley.

With their defences breached, the Argentines surrendered. On 14 June troops marched into Stanley and the town was liberated.



05/08/2014

Questions & Answers: Immigration Bill

Source: bbc.co.uk
http://m.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-24626767

22 October 2013 Last updated at 16:16

The government says it wants to make the immigration system tougher, so what is in the plans being considered by Parliament and why the current concern over the issue?


What does the government want to do about immigration?
Net migration - the difference between those coming in and leaving the UK each year - rose under Labour to more than 200,000 a year.
The coalition says that, by the next election in 2015, the total should be "tens of thousands", rather than hundreds of thousands.
The government is also promising to clamp down on illegal immigration - not included in the official figures - and benefit claims.

Why is immigration such a big political issue?
There have been concerns over pressure on services such as education and schools, while many workers say their wages are being driven down by foreign employees. Difficulties deporting foreign criminals have created unwelcome headlines too.
The rise of the UK Independence Party, which campaigns for cuts to immigration, has further heightened interest in the issue at Westminster.

What's in the Immigration Bill?
It compels landlords to check whether tenants are in the UK illegally, with those failing to do so facing large fines.
Banks will have to check immigrants' legal status before offering accounts.
Some temporary migrants - such as students - will pay a £200-a-year levy towards the cost of NHS services.
And registrars will have to inform the Home Office of planned weddings between and UK citizens those from outside Europe, to cut down on "sham" marriages.

What about deportations?
The bill says foreign criminals can be deported even before the outcome of their appeal is known, as long as they do not face "serious irreversible harm" at home.
The number of grounds for appeal against deportation is being reduced from 17 to four, which ministers say will simplify the system.

Does Labour back the plans?
Yes. At least the party says it will not oppose them in Parliament.
But it also criticises the bill, saying it does nothing to tackle exploitation of workers, and the undercutting of UK citizens' wages. Labour is promising to "amend and reform" the legislation.

Who opposes it then?
Liberal Democrat deputy leader Simon Hughes has raised concerns that it is being rushed through.
Housing groups are concerned about the onus on landlords to check tenants' status, and the British Medical Association warns that hospitals face a "bureaucratic nightmare" in levying the charges for NHS services.
Some business groups say the changes could appear hostile to outsiders and might deter investment in the UK.

Haven't there been immigration bills before?
Yes, several over the past century, including, in recent years, changes such as English language tests, restrictions on the types of workers entering the country and longer periods of "naturalisation" through marriage.
But critics insist the UK system is a "soft touch" and that more needs to be done to deter illegal immigrants and the exploitation of benefits and services.

So, will the Immigration Bill become law soon?
It looks set to get through the House of Commons with Labour's support, but could face more opposition in the Lords.
The government wants it to come into action as soon as possible.

04/08/2014

Britain, the Commonwealth and the End of the Empire

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/modern/endofempire_overview_01.shtml


By Dr John Darwin
 Last updated 2011-03-03

Britain may have emerged victorious from World War Two, but at what cost to its global

1945: End of World War Two
The collapse of British imperial power - all but complete by the mid-1960s - can be traced directly to the impact of World War Two.
The catastrophic British defeats in Europe and Asia between 1940 and 1942 destroyed its financial and economic independence, the real foundation of the imperial system.



Britain had survived the war, but its wealth, prestige and authority had been severely reduced.

It also erased the old balance of power on which British security - at home and abroad - had largely depended.
Although Britain was one of the victorious allies, the defeat of Germany had been mainly the work of Soviet and American power, while that of Japan had been an almost entirely American triumph.
Britain had survived and recovered the territory lost during the war. But its prestige and authority, not to mention its wealth, had been severely reduced.
The British found themselves locked into an imperial endgame from which every exit was blocked except the trapdoor to oblivion.
Top

1947: Partition of India
An early symptom of the weakness of the empire was Britain's withdrawal from India in 1947.
During World War Two, the British had mobilised India's resources for their imperial war effort. They crushed the attempt of Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress to force them to 'quit India' in 1942.
Nonetheless, in an earlier bid to win Congress support, Britain had promised to give India full independence once the war was over.



Britain hoped that a self-governing India would remain part of the imperial defence.

Within months of the end of the war, it was glaringly obvious that Britain lacked the means to defeat a renewed mass campaign by the Congress. Its officials were exhausted and troops were lacking.
But the British still hoped that a self-governing India would remain part of their system of 'imperial defence'. For this reason, Britain was desperate to keep India (and its army) united. These hopes came to nothing.
By the time that the last viceroy, Lord Louis Mountbatten, arrived in India, Congress and its leader Jawaharlal Nehru had begun to accept that unless they agreed to partition, they risked a descent into chaos and communal war before power could be transferred from British into Indian hands.
It was left to Mountbatten to stage a rapid handover to two successor governments (India and Pakistan) before the ink was dry on their post-imperial frontiers.
Top

Repairing Britain
The huge sense of relief at a more or less dignified exit, and much platitudinous rhetoric, disguised the fact that the end of the Raj was a staggering blow for British world power.
Britain had lost the colony that had provided much of its military muscle east of Suez, as well as paying 'rent' for the 'hire' of much of Britain's own army.
The burden of the empire defence shifted back to a Britain that was both weaker and poorer than it had been before 1939.



Britain was overshadowed by two new superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union.

For these reasons, it may seem strange that the loss of India did not lead to a drastic reappraisal of Britain's world interests and a 'timely' decision to abandon its far-flung commitments from the Caribbean to Hong Kong.
Britain was now overshadowed by the United States and Soviet Union, its domestic economy had been seriously weakened and the Labour government had embarked on a huge and expensive programme of social reform.
In fact British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and his cabinet colleague Ernest Bevin, who dominated Labour's foreign policy at the time, drew quite the opposite conclusion with regards to the future of Britain's oversees interests.
Top

Help from the Commonwealth
Attlee and Bevan believed Britain's economic recovery and the survival of sterling as a great trading currency required closer integration with the old 'white' dominions, especially Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.
The 'sterling area', which included the empire, Commonwealth (the main exception was Canada) and some other countries, accounted for half of the world's trade in the early post-war years.



British leaders had no doubt that Britain must uphold its status as the third great power.

The British were also determined to exploit the tropical colonies more effectively due to the fact that their cocoa, rubber and tin could be sold for much-needed dollars.
Nor was it simply an economic imperative. Britain's strategic defence against the new Soviet threat required forward air bases from which to bomb Southern Russia - the industrial arsenal of the Soviet Union. That meant staying on in the Middle East even after the breakdown of British control in Palestine and its hasty evacuation in 1948.
In Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and the Gulf, the British were determined to hang on to their treaties and bases, including the vast Suez canal zone. They wanted help from Australia and hoped for Indian support against Soviet influence in Asia.
Across the whole spectrum of party opinion, British leaders had no doubt that Britain must uphold its status as the third great power, and that it could only do so by maintaining its empire and the Commonwealth link. Europe, by contrast, they saw as a zone of economic and political weakness. It was Britain's overseas assets that would help to defend it.
Top

1950s: Suez Crisis
In the 1950s, British governments struggled to achieve this post-war imperial vision. They had already reinvented the Commonwealth in 1949 in order to let India remain a republic, overturning the old rule that the British monarch must be head of state in a Commonwealth country.
They accepted the need to grant increasing self-government and then independence to some of their most valuable colonies - including Ghana and Malaya in 1957 - on the understanding that they remained in Britain's sphere of financial and strategic influence.
The British governments took up the challenge of anti-colonial revolts in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. They invested heavily in up-to-date weaponry and fretted over the slowness of the British economy to resume its old role as the great lender of capital.



The 1956 Suez Crisis was a savage revelation of Britain's financial and military weakness.

By the end of the decade, things were not going well. Staying in the Middle East had led step-by-step to the confrontation with President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, and the disastrous decision to seek his overthrow by force in collusion with Israel.
The 1956 Suez Crisis was a savage revelation of Britain's financial and military weakness and destroyed much of what remained of Britain's influence in the Middle East.
In the colonial territories, more active interference in social and economic matters, with a view to speeding the pace of development, had aroused wide opposition and strengthened nationalist movements.
It was becoming much harder for Britain to control the rate of political change, especially where the presence of settlers (as in Kenya and the Rhodesias) sharpened conflicts over land.
Britain's position as the third great power and 'deputy leader' of the Western Alliance was threatened by the resurgence of France and West Germany, who jointly presided over the new European Economic Community (EEC).
Britain's claim on American support, the indispensable prop of imperial survival, could no longer be taken for granted. And Britain's own economy, far from accelerating, was stuck in a rut.
Top

1960s: Loss of the Colonies
With conditions as they stood, it was now becoming increasingly difficult to maintain even the semblance of British world power. In the 1960s, British governments attempted forlornly to make bricks without straw.
Britain tried and failed twice to enter the EEC, hoping partly to galvanise its stagnant economy, partly to smash the Franco-German 'alliance'.



Britain was finding it too costly to protect its remaining colonies.

To avoid being trapped in a costly struggle with local nationalist movements, Britain backed out of most of the remaining colonies with unseemly haste. As late as 1959, it had publicly scheduled a degree of self-government for Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. All became independent between 1961 and 1963.
British leaders gamely insisted, and no doubt believed, that Britain would remain at the 'top table' of world power - a status guaranteed by its nuclear deterrent and its continuing influence in the ex-colonial world, and symbolised by the Commonwealth which the ex-colonies had joined.
The situation did not go as planned. Britain's failure to stop the white settler revolt in Southern Rhodesia in 1965 was a huge embarrassment and drew fierce condemnation from many new Commonwealth states.
In South East Asia, protecting the new federation of Malaysia against Indonesian aggression became more and more costly.
Meanwhile the British economy staggered from crisis to crisis and the burden became unsustainable. Devaluation of the pound in November 1967 was followed within weeks by the decision to withdraw Britain's military presence east of Suez.
Top

1970s to the Present: End of Empire
When Britain finally entered the European Community in 1973, the line had been drawn under Britain's imperial age.
But the ending of an empire is rarely a tidy affair. The Rhodesian rebellion was to last until the late 1970s, Britain fought a war to retain the Falkland Islands in 1982 and Hong Kong continued, with tacit Chinese agreement, as a British dependency until 1997.



Britain experienced a large inflow of migrants - a legacy of its imperial past.

The British at home had to come to terms with an unforeseen legacy of their imperial past - the large inflow of migrants, mostly from South Asia.
In the 21st century, old imperial links still survive, particularly those based on language and law, which may assume growing importance in a globalised world.
Even the Commonwealth, bruised and battered in the 1960s and 1970s, has retained a surprising utility as a dense global network of informal connections, valued by its numerous small states.
As the experience of the empire recedes more deeply into Britain's own past, it has become the focus of more attention than ever from British historians.