The Fog of War - Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara

Documentary about Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense in the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, who subsequently became president of the World Bank. The documentary combines an interview with Mr. McNamara discussing some of the tragedies and glories of the 20th Century, archival footage, documents, and an original score by Philip Glass. Written by Richard Latham

The "Eleven Lessons" listed in the film are as follows:
1. Empathize with your enemy.
2. Rationality will not save us.
3. There's something beyond one's self.
4. Maximize efficiency.
5. Proportionality should be a guideline in war.
6. Get the data.
7. Belief and seeing are both often wrong.
8. Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning.
9. In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.
10. Never say never.
11. You can't change human nature.

"Copyright Disclaimer Under Section 107 of the Copyright Act 1976, allowance is made for "fair use" for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research. Fair use is a use permitted by copyright statute that might otherwise be infringing. Non-profit, educational or personal use tips the balance in favor of fair use."

Why military power is no longer enough

 

Force remains important in global politics. But getting people to want what you want is much more effective, argues one of America's leading foreign policy thinkers.

 

• Joseph Nye

• Observer.co.uk, Sunday 31 March 2002

 From: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/mar/31/1

 

Traditionally, the test of a great power was 'strength for war'. War was the ultimate game in which the cards of international politics were played and estimates of relative power were proven.Over the centuries, as technologies evolved, the sources of power have shifted. 

 

Today, the foundations of power have been moving away from the emphasis on military force. A combination of factors - nuclear weapons that are too awesome to use, the difficulties of building empires in an age of nationalism, the unwillingness of western societies to send their troops into battle - have conspired to make war a last resort for most advanced countries. In the words of British diplomat Robert Cooper, 'A large number of the most powerful states no longer want to fight or conquer.' War remains possible, but it is much less acceptable now than it was even half a century ago.

For most of today's great powers, the use of force would jeopardise their economic objectives. Even non-democratic countries that feel moral constraints on the use of force have to consider its effects on their economic objectives. As Thomas Friedman has put it, countries are disciplined by an "electronic herd" of investors who control their access to capital in a globalised economy. Force remains important as we saw on September 11, 2000 and in Afghanistan. But it is also important to mobilise international coalitions and build institutions to address shared threats and challenges.

As I explain in my book The Paradox of American Power: Why the world's Superpower can't go it Alone, no country today is great enough to solve the problem of global terrorism alone. There is also an indirect way to exercise power. A country may secure the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries aspire to its level of prosperity and openness. It is just as important to set the agenda in world politics and attract others as it is to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic weapons.


This aspect of power is "soft power" - getting people to want what you want.  Wise parents know that if they have brought up their children with the right values, their power will be greater than if they have relied only on cutting off allowances or taking away the car keys. Similarly, political leaders and thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci have long understood the power that comes from determining the framework of a debate. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to force you to do what you do not want to do.

 Soft power is not simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to grow. Imperious policies that utilised Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And countries like Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is greater than their military and economic weight because of their support for international aid and peace-keeping.

The countries that are likely to gain soft power are those closest to global norms of liberalism, pluralism, and autonomy; those with the most access to multiple channels of communication; and those whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international performance. These dimensions of power give a strong advantage to the United States and Europe. 

By the late 1930s, the Roosevelt administration became convinced that 'America's security depended on its ability to speak to and to win the support of people in other countries.' With World War II and the Cold War, the government sponsored efforts including the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America and the Fulbright student exchange programme. But much soft power arises from forces outside government control.

Even before the Cold War, 'American corporate and advertising executives, as well as the heads of Hollywood studios, were selling not only their products but also America's culture and values, the secrets of its success, to the rest of the world.' 

There are areas, such as the Middle East, where ambivalence about, or outright opposition to, American culture limits its soft power. All television in the Arab world used to be state-run until tiny Qatar allowed a new station, Al-Jazeera, to broadcast freely, and it proved wildly popular in the Middle East. Its uncensored images, ranging from Osama bin Laden to Tony Blair, have had a powerful political influence. Bin Laden's ability to project a Robin Hood image enhanced his soft power with some Muslims around the globe. As an Arab journalist described the situation earlier, 'Al-Jazeera has been for this intifada what CNN was to the Gulf War.' In the eyes of Islamic fundamentalists, the openness of Western culture is repulsive. 

But for much of the world, including many moderates and young people, our culture still attracts. To the extent that official policies at home and abroad are consistent with democracy, human rights, openness, and respect for the opinions of others, the United States and Europe will benefit from the trends of this global information age, although pockets of fundamentalism will persist and react in some countries. 

Power in the global information age is becoming less coercive among advanced countries. But most of the world does not consist of post-industrial societies, and that limits the transformation of power.


Much of Africa and the Middle East remains locked in pre-industrial agricultural societies with weak institutions and authoritarian rulers. Other countries, such as China, India, and Brazil, are industrial economies analogous to parts of the West in the mid-twentieth century. In such a variegated world, all three sources of power - military, economic, and soft - remain relevant.

However, if current economic and social trends continue, leadership in the information revolution and soft power will become more important in the mix.  

Joseph S. Nye, Jr. is Dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. This is extracted from an essay in Re-ordering the World: The long-term implications of September 11, published by The Foreign Policy Centre (http://www.fpc.org.uk). 

John F Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis

 By Professor Ernest R May
Last updated 2013-11-18

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/kennedy_cuban_missile_01.shtml

For fourteen days during October 1962, the world held its breath as John F Kennedy (known as JFK) and Nikita Khrushchev tried to reach a compromise and avoid nuclear war. Ernest May investigates how Kennedy demonstrated his leadership skills during the crisis.

The 'gravest issues'

Early on Tuesday 16 October 1962, John F Kennedy's national security assistant, McGeorge Bundy, brought to the President's bedroom some high-altitude photographs taken from U-2 planes flying over Cuba. They showed Soviet soldiers hurriedly and secretly setting up nuclear-armed missiles.

For some time previously the Soviets had openly been sending weaponry to Cuba, including surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles (SAMs). To deflect any criticism about this from the Republicans, who were busy campaigning for the November congressional elections, Kennedy had said he would not protest about such defensive weaponry being installed in Cuba, but warned that if the Soviets ever introduced offensive weapons, 'the gravest issues would arise.'

The 'gravest issues' were at hand.

Since Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had promised repeatedly not to send offensive weapons to Cuba, and America's top intelligence analysts had predicted that he would keep his word, Kennedy felt safe in voicing this warning. The U-2 photographs, however, showed that Khrushchev had been lying. The 'gravest issues' were at hand.

The United States at the time had more than 25,000 nuclear weapons in their arsenal. The Soviet Union had not quite half as many. Kennedy's predecessor, Dwight Eisenhower, had calculated in 1960 that, if a crisis led either side to fire nuclear weapons, all humans in the northern hemisphere could perish. 'Gravest issues' indeed.

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The ExComm and the secret tapes

A P2V Neptune US patrol plane flying over a Soviet freighter during the Cuban missile crisis, 1962  ©To help him decide what to do about the Cuban situation, and how much risk to run of a nuclear exchange, Kennedy assembled a small group that came to be called the Executive Committee of the National Security Council - or ExComm for short. Early in his presidency, Kennedy had had to make a decision about a CIA plan to land Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs, in Cuba, with the hope that these exiles would overthrow Cuba's Communist government, headed by Fidel Castro. Kennedy had asked for advice about this from only a handful of people - those he knew he was officially obliged to consult. The operation proved to be a fiasco, and afterwards Kennedy had resolved in future to consult more widely.

Included in the ExComm were the regular participants in National Security Council meetings, plus Kennedy's brother, the attorney general Robert Kennedy, and the President's chief speechwriter, the White House counsel Theodore Sorensen. Both of these men could help Kennedy to think about the domestic political aspects of the crisis. The President also invited several other key advisors to join the group: C Douglas Dillon, who had held high posts under Eisenhower and who gave Kennedy a link to the Republican leadership; Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett, who had served under President Harry Truman and could help Kennedy see the current crisis in longer historical perspective; and a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Llewellyn (Tommy) Thompson, probably the person in the President's circle who was best acquainted with Khrushchev.

We know today exactly what was said in the meetings of the ExComm, because Kennedy had a tape recorder installed in an unused part of the White House basement ...

We know today exactly what was said in the meetings of the ExComm, because Kennedy had a tape recorder installed in an unused part of the White House basement, with wires running to concealed microphones in the Oval Office and Cabinet Room. He had told no one about this other than his private secretary, the two guards who maintained the machines, and perhaps his brother, Robert. Since he kept it on through almost all ExComm meetings, anyone today can listen in on the proceedings.

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Quarantine

In the first day's debates, everyone favoured bombing Cuba. The only differences concerned the scale of attack. Kennedy, Bundy, and some others spoke of a 'surgical strike' solely against the missile sites. 'It corresponds to "the punishment fits the crime" in political terms', said Bundy. Others joined the chiefs of staff in insisting that an attack should also take out air defence sites and bombers, so as to limit losses of US aircraft and prevent an immediate air reprisal against US bases in Florida.

The under secretary of state, George Ball, had commented that a US surprise attack on Cuba would be '... like Pearl Harbor ...'

By the third day, 18 October, another option had come to the fore. The under secretary of state, George Ball, had commented that a US surprise attack on Cuba would be '... like Pearl Harbor. It's the kind of conduct that one might expect of the Soviet Union. It is not conduct that one expects of the United States.' Robert Kennedy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk concurred, Rusk observing that the decision-makers could carry 'the mark of Cain' on their brows for the rest of their lives. To meet this concern and to obtain time for gaining support from other nations, there developed the idea of the President's publicly announcing the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba, ordering a blockade to prevent the introduction of further missiles, and demanding that the Soviets withdraw the missiles already there. (Both for legal reasons and for resonance with Franklin Roosevelt's 'Quarantine Address' of 1937, the term 'quarantine' was substituted for 'blockade'.)

To those of Kennedy's advisers who still favoured quick use of military force (the 'hawks' in later classification), this quarantine constituted an ultimatum. If Khrushchev did not capitulate within a day or two, a US air attack on Cuba would follow, followed before long by an invasion. For those in the ExComm who would later be classed as 'doves,' the quarantine bought time for possibly developing some diplomatic solution.

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A Berlin crisis, not a Cuba crisis

American tanks on alert in the Berlin Grunewald, West Germany, as the crisis over the Cuban blockade looms during the Cuban missile crisis (25th October 1962)  ©In the early phase of ExComm debate, Kennedy blamed himself for the crisis - 'Last month I should have said that we don't care' - implying that if he had not given such a strong public warning, he could possibly have let Khrushchev get away with placing missiles in Cuba; 'It doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an ICBM flying from the Soviet Union, or one from 90 miles away. Geography doesn't mean that much', he said. But Kennedy explained over and over to members of the ExComm and others why, since he had issued the warning and Khrushchev had chosen to challenge him, the crisis involved much more than just a personal affront. The reason was that, for Kennedy, the crisis was not centrally about missiles in Cuba; it was about Berlin.

The Soviets had tried to take over West Berlin in 1948-9. Their blockade had been frustrated by an Anglo-American airlift and by the astonishing resolution of the West Berliners, but in 1958 Khrushchev had once more revived the threat, and he continued to do so. In 1961, he and the East Germans built a wall around West Berlin as a stopgap measure to halt the exodus of East Germans from Soviet-controlled areas. Earlier in 1962 he had told Kennedy that he intended to act on West Berlin as soon as the US congressional elections were over.

... Kennedy interpreted the installation of missiles in Cuba as a move preparatory to a showdown on Berlin.

Counselled by Thompson, Kennedy interpreted the installation of missiles in Cuba as a move preparatory to a showdown on Berlin. For him, such a showdown would create a horrible dilemma. The United States had promised to protect the million and a half West Berliners from Soviet take-over, but had no means whatever for physically preventing the thousands of East German and Soviet troops that surrounded Berlin from taking control of the city if they chose to do so. The only protection for West Berlin was the US threat to respond to an attack by using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union.

If Kennedy demanded uncompromisingly that the Soviets remove their nuclear weapons from Cuba, Khrushchev would have to decide whether to comply or to take the risk of actual war, which might become a nuclear war. The onus would be on him. If Kennedy showed weakness in face of Khrushchev's challenge, the effect might be to embolden Khrushchev to ignore American warnings about Berlin. It would then be Kennedy, not Khrushchev, who would bear the onus. 'A Soviet move on Berlin,' Kennedy said to the joint chiefs of staff, 'leaves me only one alternative, which is to fire nuclear weapons - which is a hell of an alternative.'

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Dreadful days

Robert McNamara in 1965  ©On Monday 22 October, Kennedy went on radio and television, describing the secret Soviet build-up in Cuba, proclaiming the quarantine, and demanding that the Soviets remove the missiles. In the next few days, one harrowing moment followed another.

Kennedy and his advisers mulled over the question of how actually to stop a Soviet ship that crossed the quarantine line. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara described the Navy's plan for dealing with a Soviet submarine that was escorting a merchantman. A destroyer would use small depth charges to signal that the submarine should surface. McNamara acknowledged that the submarine commander might think he was being attacked rather than being sent a signal and might fire at the destroyer. Kennedy said, 'I think we ought to wait on that today. We don't want to have the first thing we attack as a Soviet submarine. I'd much rather have a merchant ship.'

... one harrowing moment followed another.

When McNamara protested, Kennedy gave way, but, as his brother Robert recalled later: 'His hand went up to his face and covered his mouth, and he closed his fist. His eyes were tense, almost grey, and we just stared at each other across the table.' Fortunately, before there was an encounter at sea, Khrushchev ordered all Soviet merchantmen bound for Cuba to turn back.

Meanwhile, Kennedy and his advisers faced the question of how to keep track of continuing missile construction in Cuba. At the urging of McNamara and the chiefs of staff, Kennedy authorised low-level daytime surveillance flights in addition to continuing U-2 flights. He also agreed provisionally to night-time coverage involving the use of flares. Vice-President Lyndon Johnson worried aloud about these. 'Imagine some crazy Russian captain,' he said. 'The damn thing goes "blooey" and lights up the skies. He might just pull a trigger. Looks like we're playing Fourth of July over there or something.' Also fortunately, the crisis ended before flares were actually used.

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Finessing the Turkish missiles issue

On 26-27 October, the crisis came to a head. Khrushchev cabled Kennedy that he was prepared to remove missiles from Cuba in return for a US promise not to invade Cuba - a promise that had already been given more than once. But, just as Kennedy and his ExComm began to discuss a response, Khrushchev broadcast from Moscow a second message saying the missiles would be removed if, in addition, the United States withdrew nuclear missiles and other 'offensive means' from Turkey.

The second Khrushchev message provoked furious debate. With Ball in the lead, Kennedy's advisers said almost unanimously that Khrushchev's new condition was unacceptable. America's NATO allies would think the United States was sacrificing their security for the sake of its own. Kennedy alone seemed unconvinced. When Ball said, 'If we talked to the Turks... this would be an extremely unsettling business', Kennedy replied with asperity, 'Well, this is unsettling now, George, because ... most people would regard this as not an unreasonable proposal ... I think you're going to have it very difficult to explain why we are going to take hostile military action in Cuba ... when he's saying, "If you'll get yours out of Turkey, we'll get ours out of Cuba."'.

What Kennedy wanted was to mollify Khrushchev without seeming to make a concession, and above all to avoid any prolonged negotiations.

In the end, Kennedy found a way to finesse the situation. He sent Robert Kennedy to see the Soviet ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, to tell him that the missiles in Turkey were obsolete, and that the US planned to pull them out within about six months. All this was true. He said further, however, that, if the Soviet Union used this knowledge to claim that the US had struck the deal proposed in Khrushchev's radio message, Kennedy would deny the claim and would not remove the missiles from Turkey. What Kennedy wanted was to mollify Khrushchev without seeming to make a concession, and above all to avoid any prolonged negotiations. He had to insist that Soviet missiles come out of Cuba unconditionally, or he would compromise the display of firmness that he judged necessary to protect against a Berlin crisis.

In fact, the exchange between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin had no effect. Khrushchev had already decided to retreat to a simple request for a no invasion pledge. And the crisis ended on that basis. US reconnaissance aircraft kept watch while the Soviets dismantled their missiles and loaded the parts on ships for return to the Soviet Union.

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Resolution

The world escaped nuclear war in October 1962 largely because of the prudence of Kennedy and the belated prudence of Khrushchev. Though Kennedy had felt it necessary to be uncompromising in his demand for removal of the missiles from Cuba, he had been careful to put off to the last possible moment any action that could result in killing a Russian. Khrushchev had probably decided to drop his demand for quid pro quo removals from Turkey as a result of learning that a Soviet anti-aircraft missile in Cuba had shot down a US U-2 plane, killing the pilot. Kennedy and Khrushchev both recognised that, once blood had been spilled, it would be very hard to keep any crisis under control.

Kennedy and Khrushchev both recognised that, once blood had been spilled, it would be very hard to keep any crisis under control.

Because Khrushchev had been faced down, he did not force a new Berlin crisis. The Soviet bloc lived for the next 27 years with a wall around West Berlin that marked East Germany as a huge penitentiary, and it eventually became possible for west and east to turn towards the stabilising compromises of the later period of détente.

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Find out more

Books

The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis by Ernest May, Philip Zelikow, Ernest R. May (Editor), Philip D. Zelikow (Editor) (W.W. Norton, 2002)

Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam by Lawrence Freedman , (Oxford University Press, 2002)

One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy J Naftali, (W.W. Norton & Company, 1998)

The Cuban Missile Crisis (The Cold War) by Peter Chrisp (Hodder Wayland, 2001)

An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 by Robert Dallek (Little, Brown, to be published in 2003)

Kennedy by Hugh Brogan (Longman, 1996)

The Presidency of John F. Kennedy by James N Giglio (University Press of Kansas, 1991)

President Kennedy: Profile of Power by Richard Reeves (Simon & Schuster, 1993)

The Modern American Presidency by Lewis L Gould (University Press of Kansas, 2003)

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About the author

Ernest R May is Charles Warren Professor of History at Harvard University. He is co-editor (with Philip Zelikow) of The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis(originally issued in 1997 and updated since) and of The Presidential Recordings: John F. Kennedy: the Great Crises (3 volumes, issued in 2002). His other recent book is Strange Victory: Hitler's Conquest of France (2000). Earlier books have dealt with the making of the Monroe Doctrine, American expansion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, America's intervention in World War I, American Cold War strategy, and uses of historical reasoning in decision-making.

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Kill 'em All': The American Military in Korea

By Jeremy Williams
Last updated 2011-02-17

http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_usa_01.shtml

In September 1999 an investigative team from the Associated Press broke a story that shocked America. Fifty years before, they claimed, refugees caught up in the Korean War were shot and strafed by US forces. Jeremy Williams explores the repercussions of a brutal episode in Cold War history.

 

The Forgotten War

The Korean War was a bloody conflict. It left Korea, North and South, with several million dead and the UN forces involved in the fighting with over 100,000 casualties. But despite fighting as intense and as violent as any other conflict since World War Two, Korea has always been history's 'Forgotten War'.

...US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield.

While atrocities conducted both by North and South Korean forces have already been documented, recently a much darker side to the US involvement in the Korean War has begun to emerge. It casts a shadow over the conduct of US forces during the conflict, particularly of officers and generals in command. Declassified military documents recently found in the US National Archives show clearly how US commanders repeatedly, and without ambiguity, ordered forces under their control to target and kill Korean refugees caught on the battlefield. More disturbing still have been the published testimonies of Korean survivors who recall such killings, and the frank accounts of those American veterans brave enough to admit involvement.

Korean captured by US soldier  ©The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when communist North Korea invaded the South with six army divisions. These North Korean forces, backed by impressive Soviet equipment including tanks, made quick gains into the territory. The United States decided to intervene in the defence of the South and, taking advantage of the Soviet absence from the UN Security Council, proceeded to press for UN resolutions condemning the invasion. Days later a resolution was passed calling upon member countries to give assistance to South Korea to repulse the attack. General Douglas MacArthur, then in charge of US forces in the Pacific and of the occupation of Japan, was appointed commander of the joint forces.

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Undertrained and underprepared

Things began to go wrong almost immediately for the American troops. Those who were rushed to the front line straight from occupation duty in Tokyo in July 1950 were undertrained and underprepared. They were also badly led and quickly defeated by superior North Korean forces. US commanders were outmanoeuvred by North Korean units using guerrilla methods to target US lines from the rear.

Detail from US military records  ©But there was another problem. The surprise attack from the North had generated a very real refugee crisis. Just weeks after the conflict had begun, up to two million refugees were streaming across the battlefield; they clogged the roads and the UN lines.

Under pressure and fearing North Korean infiltration, the US leadership panicked. Soon command saw all civilians as the enemy regardless. On 26 July the US 8th Army, the highest level of command in Korea, issued orders to stop all Korean civilians. 'No, repeat, no refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in group will cease immediately.' On the very same day the first major disaster involving civilians struck.

...up to 400 South Korean civilians gathered by the bridge were killed by US forces from the 7th Cavalry Regiment.

The stone bridge near the village of No Gun Ri spans a small stream. It is similar to a great many others that cross the landscape of South Korea, except that the walls of this bridge were, until very recently, pockmarked by hundreds of bullet holes. On the very day that the US 8th Army delivered its stop refugee order in July 1950, up to 400 South Korean civilians gathered by the bridge were killed by US forces from the 7th Cavalry Regiment. Some were shot above the bridge, on the railroad tracks. Others were strafed by US planes. More were killed under the arches in an ordeal that local survivors say lasted for three days.

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Deadly orders

Yang Hae Chan, a survivor of the massacre at No Gun Ri  ©'The floor under the bridge was a mixture of gravel and sand. People clawed with their bare hands to make holes to hide in,' recalls survivor Yang Hae Chan. 'Other people piled up the dead like a barricade, and hid behind the bodies as a shield against the bullets.'

Corroborating the Korean survivors' testimony are the accounts of 35 veterans of the 7th Cavalry Regiment who recall events at No Gun Ri. Perspectives differ, but the detailed memories of veterans recalling events burnt into their souls by their first days in combat are as painful as they are shocking.

'There was a lieutenant screaming like a madman, fire on everything, kill 'em all,' recalls 7th Cavalry veteran Joe Jackman. 'I didn't know if they were soldiers or what. Kids, there was kids out there, it didn't matter what it was, eight to 80, blind, crippled or crazy, they shot 'em all.'

Along with the My Lai atrocity 20 years later in Vietnam, the killings discovered at No Gun Ri mark one of the largest single massacres of civilians by American forces in the 20th century. When the news of the killings at No Gun Ri was first broken by a team of investigative journalists from the Associated Press in September 1999, the effects were to be as seismic as the allegations themselves.

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Darkness revealed

America was deeply shocked by the AP report. Previously, the US Army had dismissed the claims of South Korean survivors who, since 1960, had been trying to tell the truth about the killings at No Gun Ri. The Army said that US forces were not even in the area of No Gun Ri at the time of the killings. But not only did new evidence put No Gun Ri firmly within the US 7th Cavalry area of operations at the time, the discovery of US veterans willing to talk about events 50 years later made the massacre undeniable. The Clinton administration quickly directed that the Pentagon, specifically the Army, conduct an investigation into what actually happened at No Gun Ri.

...as late as January 1951, the US 8th Army was detailing all units in Korea that refugees be attacked with all available fire including bombing.

Since the original AP report, more documents detailing refugee 'kill' orders have been unearthed at the US national archives. They point to the widespread targeting of refugees by commanders well after No Gun Ri. In August 1950 there were orders detailing that refugees crossing the Naktong River be shot. Later in the same month, General Gay, commander of the 1st Cavalry Division (of which the 7th Cavalry Regiment involved at No Gun Ri was part), actually ordered artillery units to target civilians on the battlefield. And as late as January 1951, the US 8th Army was detailing all units in Korea that refugees be attacked with all available fire including bombing.

Detail from US military instructions  ©New allegations have also emerged of the indiscriminate killing of civilians in Korea. In August 1950, 80 civilians are reported to have been killed while seeking sanctuary in a shrine by the village of Kokaan-Ri, near Masan in South Korea. Other survivors recall 400 civilians killed by US naval artillery on the beaches near the port of Pohang in September 1950, and dozens of villages across southern South Korea report the repeated low-level strafing by US planes of 'people in white' during July and August 1950. A total of 61 separate incidents involving the killing of civilians by US forces are now logged with the South Korean authorities.

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Denial

Detail from US Air Force memo  ©The Pentagon inquiry into No Gun Ri was finally released in January 2001. The basis of its conclusions are doubtful. The investigation acknowledged the killing of civilians at No Gun Ri by US forces, but it concluded that the killings that took place there were not deliberate attacks but 'an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war'.

...clear orders had been given by command not to let refugees through the lines.

Yet whatever the confusion on the battlefield at the time, clear orders had been given by command not to let refugees through the lines. More importantly, documents showed orders had actually been received by the 8th Cavalry Regiment, sister to the 7th Cavalry involved at No Gun Ri. 'No refugees to cross the line. Fire everyone trying to cross the lines. Use discretion in the case of women and children.' This was an order from the headquarters of the 1st Cavalry Division.

More documents were discovered that showed that the Air Force was strafing civilians at the request of the Army. Air Force Colonel Turner Rogers wrote a memo the day before events at No Gun Ri. 'The Army has requested we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted approaching our positions,' the memo read. It went on to confirm the instructions had been acted upon. 'To date, we have complied with the army request in this respect.'

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Veterans speak out

Despite this the Pentagon maintains in the report that no orders were issued to shoot refugees at No Gun Ri. This rather narrow frame of reference effectively ignores whatever evidence there might be of other orders given at the time to treat civilians as the enemy. Only orders specifically mentioning No Gun Ri would qualify. Even so this is a surprising conclusion to draw for a number of other reasons.

...a significant number of the veterans interviewed did in fact recall orders to open fire on the civilians at No Gun Ri.

Firstly, the oral testimony given by veterans of the 7th Cavalry to the Pentagon during its 14-month investigation may contradict the Pentagon's position. This evidence has never been made fully public, but what has been discovered by those allowed access to the material, is that a significant number of the veterans interviewed did in fact recall orders to open fire on the civilians at No Gun Ri.

Secondly, the 7th Cavalry communications log - the log that might have contained evidence of such orders had they been given - has gone missing. The significance of this is highlighted by Charles Hanley, one of the AP journalists who first investigated No Gun Ri. '[The Pentagon] report declares that there were no orders at No Gun Ri - and it declares that flatly - but it doesn't have the document that would prove that one way or the other.'

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Seeking the truth

A ceremony in Korea commemorating victims of the Korean War  ©The inconsistencies that surround the Pentagon's investigation have even led those brought in as independent advisors to voice doubts. Pete McCloskey, a decorated Korean War veteran and former Congressman, was brought in to advise on the Pentagon report. He was disappointed with what was finally published. 'I think the American government, the Pentagon and most government agencies don't want to see the truth come out if it will embarrass the government.

I think the American government, the Pentagon and most government agencies don't want to see the truth come out if it will embarrass the government.

'I think it's almost a rule of political science. The government will always lie about embarrassing matters. And when you are up in the Pentagon a full Colonel and have a chance to make General, and General with the chance to become Chief of Staff, there's as much politics high in the Pentagon as there is in the halls of Congress. And I think that the Army just chose to try and down play the terrible character of Army leadership in 1950.'

It is now nearly 50 years since the end of the conflict in Korea. The only major American investigation into the killing of refugees focused exclusively on the activities of the US Army over a small geographic area during one month of a conflict that lasted three years. Contradicting testimony from veterans and Korean survivors, the report concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that orders to kill civilians were given at No Gun Ri. Clearly there are still many unanswered questions over American involvement in Korea, questions that were not answered by the narrow view of the US Army's investigation. Yet this burden now falls not on those responsible for giving the orders, but on the veterans and survivors alike.

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Find out more

Books

The Bridge at No Gun Ri by Charles J Hanley, Sang-Hun Choe and Martha Mendoza with researcher Randy Herschaft (Henry Holt and Co, 2001)

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About the author

Jeremy Williams produced Kill 'em All, a Timewatch documentary about the No Gun Ri killings and American military conduct in Korea.

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The Korean War: An Overview

By Michael Hickey

Last updated 2011-03-21
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/coldwar/korea_hickey_01.shtml

 

The Cold War turned hot for the first time in the Korean peninsula in the mid-1950s. Michael Hickey provides an overview of the so-called 'forgotten war'.

 
 

Introduction

 

At the mid-point of a century that had already seen two appallingly destructive and costly global conflicts, a savage war broke out in a remote country at the extremity of the Asian landmass. During the world war of 1939-45, the future of the Japanese empire was decided at Allied summit meetings. In the short term, pending the return of Korean independence, Korea, a Japanese colony since 1910, was to be occupied north of the 38th parallel by Soviet Russia. To the south, a United States military administration under the direction of General Douglas MacArthur would control the area from its headquarters in Tokyo.

In the North, the Soviets backed a Stalinist regime under their client Kim Il-sung and created the North Korean Peoples' Army, equipped with Russian tanks and artillery. In the South, the chaotic political situation resulted in an American-backed administration under the presidency of Syngman Rhee, whose openly declared aim was the imposition of national unity by force. As a result of this stance, the Americantrained South Korean army was limited to a lightly armed gendarmerie, lacking tanks, combat aircraft and all but a small amount of field artillery.

The North Koreans advanced rapidly south, aiming to take the vital port of Pusan.

After several years of increasingly bloody frontier incidents along the 38th parallel, the Republic of Korea was invaded by the North Korean Peoples' Army on 25 June 1950. Despite earlier indications, the Pentagon was caught off-guard. As the North Koreans swept south, overwhelming all opposition, the US called on the Security Council to invoke the United Nations Charter and brand the North Koreans as aggressors. This was done and member states were called on to send in military assistance. The first American troops were then sent in to stiffen resistance against the invader. The British government responded at once and elements of the Far East Fleet were soon in action along the Korean coast, together with ships of Commonwealth navies. However, the North Koreans still advanced rapidly south, aiming to take the vital port of Pusan. The American troops hurriedly sent from occupation duties in Japan fared badly against superior North Korean troops, but General Walton Walker, commanding the 8th United States Army in Korea (EUSAK), rallied his forces and held the Pusan bridgehead as reinforcements began to arrive. These reinforcements included two British battalions from Hong Kong, the Middlesex and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, and an Australian battalion from Japan. Furthermore, a strong brigade group was mobilised in England and several thousand reservists were recalled to active duty. The 29th Brigade set sail in October 1950, reaching Korea a month later just as it seemed that the war was over.

China's intervention
 

In mid-September, General MacArthur brought off a masterstroke by landing two divisions 240km (150 miles) in the enemy rear at the port of Inchon. Their communications cut, and under heavy aerial bombardment, the North Koreans broke and fled back north; MacArthur ordered a hot pursuit which led across the 38th parallel and deep into North Korea. As the victorious UN forces drew near to the Manchurian border, there were ominous signals from Peking that communist China would intervene to defend its territory. In mid- October, MacArthur met President Harry Truman on Wake Island in their first encounter to assure him that a massive UN offensive was about to conclude the war victoriously by Christmas. No sooner had this been launched in November than the Chinese unleashed their armies.

...there were ominous signals from Peking that communist China would intervene to defend its territory.

 

The UN forces recoiled in disorder and, by the new year, were defending a line well to the south of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Morale was low but the new field commander, General Ridgway, revived his heterogeneous command and advanced slowly north in the spring of 1951. By mid-April, the allies were back in the area of the 38th parallel when the Chinese launched their spring offensive. The British 29th Brigade narrowly escaped annihilation on the Imjin river as the 27th Commonwealth brigade on the central front beat off savage Chinese attacks. The UN line held, then moved north again. This time, there was no reckless advance into the north. The line stabilised in the general area of the 38th parallel and the remaining two years of fighting consisted of near-static operations as both sides fought from heavily fortified positions, using artillery, mines and wire to deny the enemy access to strategically important ground.

Throughout the war, air power was decisive. The North Korean air force was driven from the skies by US Air Force, Navy and Marines, using their superior equipment and training. Heavy bombers razed the cities and industrial plants of North Korea. Continuous attacks on the transport system forced the Chinese to rely on the packhorse for much of their logistical support. A new phase of air war opened when American B-29 bombers and their fighter escorts were challenged by Russian-built MiG-15 fighters flown by Chinese airmen. The MiG-15's outflew first-generation American jet fighters until the introduction of the swept-wing F-86 Sabre tipped the balance. In the world's first supersonic air combats, the Americans prevailed.

 

Stalemate

The allies achieved total naval supremacy when the North Korean navy's torpedo boats were blown out of the water by UN firepower. For the rest of the war, American, British, Commonwealth and other allied ships maintained a tight blockade on North Korea. In addition, naval aviation played a leading role in air support of the army on the ground.

In July 1953, a great calm descended over the battlefields...

In mid-1951, with the land battle in stalemate, both sides agreed to go to the conference table and armistice talks began. They dragged on for two years. The main haggling point was the future of the tens of thousands of communist prisoners held in camps on Koje Island off the coast of South Korea. While the communist negotiators were adamant that all were to be returned to their country of origin, thousands of prisoners were unwilling to be repatriated. There were several great mutinies in the Koje camps before a satisfactory formula enabled those who wished to be repatriated to go home and for asylum to be granted to those who wished otherwise. In July 1953, a great calm descended over the battlefields and in Operation Big Switch, thousands of former prisoners on each side were returned. A Demilitarised Zone or

DMZ was established on the border. Both sides withdrew from their fighting positions, and a UN

commission was set up to supervise the armistice.

Some 100,000 British servicemen and women served in the Japan-Korea theatre during the war. In July 1951, with the arrival of the strong Canadian brigade, the British, Australian, New Zealand and Indian units were formed into the 1st Commonwealth Division, which soon gained an enviable reputation among its allies.

 

The aftermath

No one knows exactly how many people died in this war. In a sense it was a civil war fought out with foreign participation on both sides. It was the first military test of the United Nations and also the last martial adventure of the old Commonwealth. The American Department of Defence acknowledges that almost 40,000 of its servicemen died, either in battle or of other causes. British casualties were 1,078 killed in action, 2,674 wounded and 1,060 missing or taken prisoner. It was the first military test of the United Nations and also the last martial adventure of the old Commonwealth.

The true casualty figures for the North and South Koreans and Chinese will never be known. It is

estimated that some 46,000 South Korean soldiers were killed and over 100,000 wounded. The Chinese are estimated by the Pentagon as having lost over 400,000 killed (including Mao Tse-tung's son) and 486,000 wounded, with over 21,000 captured. The North Koreans lost about 215,000 killed, 303,000 wounded and over 101,000 captured or missing.

British veterans of the campaign were left with abiding memories of a South Korea which had been deprived of its dignity, fought over and ruined, its demoralised population brought to beggary and its infrastructure destroyed. Since 1953, the Republic of Korea has transformed into a modern state. In the North, however, the Stalinist regime created by Kim Il-sung is only now beginning to move out of its hermit state. The economy is in ruins and famine stalks the land. It is too early to say if the tentative moves towards reconciliation will result in attainment of the unity so deeply desired by many Koreans.

Find out more
Books
The Korean War: The West Confronts Communism, 1950-1953

by Michael Hickey (John Murray, 1999)

About the author

Michael Hickey was commissioned in 1949 and served with the RASC in Korea from 1950-52. In 1981, he retired as a General Staff Colonel with the Ministry of Defence. He is the author of The Unforgettable Army - Slim and the 14th Army in Burma (1992); Gallipoli (1995) and The Korean War 1950-53 (1999).